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THE ARBITRATION COMMISSION: PRIME MOVER OR FACILITATOR?
The Tenth Sir Richard Kirby Lecture 
in Industria l  Relations
U niversity  of W ollongong 
5 October 1988
b y
Professor J.E. Isaac 
U nivers ity  o f  M elbourne
The  Arbi t rat ion Commi ss i on :  Pr ime Move r  or  Faci l i ta tor?
It is a great honour and a very special pleasure to be giving the Tenth 
Sir R ichard Kirby Lecture in Industrial Relations, the p leasure  enhanced by the
presence here tonight of Sir Richard himself and Lady Kirby. It is a great 
privilege to have known them both for twenty-five years and to share the respect 
and affection which countless others have for them.
I confess to embarrassment when I recall my early prattling on industrial 
relations, and the forbearance and generosity with which Sir R ichard treated that 
bumptious academic who, although innocent of the rough and tumble of 
industrial life, had the audacity to tell the Commission what it should be doing. Let 
me confess too that since then, I have come under Sir Richard's spell; for what 1 
have to say this evening draws on his writings, his decisions and his wisdom 
imparted in personal discussion. However, I have extended what I have learnt 
from him to events and developments beyond the time of  his retirement from the
Commission in 1973. And he may well disagree with my extrapolation. His is 
therefore not responsible for what I have to say.
The theme of my paper is reflected in its title. I come to the conclusion that the
Commission like its predecessor, the Conciliation and Arbitration Court, is 
essentially a facilita tor rather than a prime mover or an innovator, reactive 
rather than proactive, in the formulation and application o f  industrial principles.
This conclusion may not seem obvious from a reading o f  tribunal decisions, 
particularly the earlier  ones, or from media commentaries or indeed from the 
expositions of some academic w riters .1 The impression is easily drawn from the
announcement o f  a new principle or a new approach to wage fixing that, in some 
sense, the tribunal is its author or creator. And credit or blame is heaped on the 
tribunal, usually on its President, as the genius, benign or evil, rather than on
the parties which appear before the tribunal. It is assumed that the tribunal has 
a kind of magic wand with the aid of which it can do this or that as it wishes, based 
on its own philosophy of what is good, a free agent able to take initiatives against 
the tide of forces in the labour market and beyond, an independent variable in 
the labour m arket equation.
Such a view of the tribunal's role is misleading. It is also dangerous because it 
creates expectations about the function and capacity o f  the arbitration system
which arc unrealistic and perhaps even inconsistent with the terms of its 
existence. The Commission and earlier the Court, have generally performed in a 
manner dictated by their charter as set down in the Acts under which they 
operate. Promotion of the public interest is the key objective of the Commission 
and although "public interest" is not defined, it is a reasonable inference from 
various sections o f  the Act that concern for industrial peace and adverse 
economic consequences are the pillars on which this objective rests. The public 
interest is not served by prescribing o f  principles and polic ies , however 
admirable they may seem on paper, which do not work in practice, which arc 
flouted or which do not have general community support or which generate an 
unacceptable degree of unrest or adverse economic consequences.
Thus to serve its charter, the Commission has to tailor its principles and to apply 
them in a way which minimises adverse economic, industrial and social 
consequences. I choose to put it negatively rather than positively in terms of
m aximising economic, industrial and social benefits because, realistically, it is 
inherent in conflict resolution processes to minimise loss to the parties and to the 
community. This is not to say that mediation processes by conciliation and 
arbitration do not lead to constructive and positive developm ents in industrial 
r e l a t i o n s .
It follows that in order to secure community commitment, the Commission must 
try to frame principles which by and large conform to comm unity values and 
expectations. It must draw heavily on the material submitted at hearings and 
form a judgem ent on what system would work best in the circumstances. The
changes in principles and approaches which have occurred over the history of
the Court and the Commission have come about mainly from changes in the 
economic, industrial and social environm ent rather than from changes in the 
personnel and ideas of the tribunal. This is not to underrate the importance of 
the persons who make up the tribunal. Their capacity to grasp the issues and to 
form correct judgement, not on what would be ideal but on what would work best 
in the circumstances, has obviously been critical in the operation of the system. 
In this task, they have acted primarily not as the originators of standards and 
principles but as the interpreters of the signs o f  the times and the facilitators of 
an approach which would serve these signs most effectively. In retrospect, there
have been errors o f  timing and magnitude of adjustment in the application of 
principles. No system can be expected to work perfectly. But the direction of 
decisions has generally been to meet the requirements of the times.
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T h e  E a r l y  H i s t o r y
Let me draw on the records to illustrate the point. History helps us to understand 
the present and to assess future prospects.
From their early history to the present time, tribunals have reflected on their
function and have indicated implicitly or explicitly, the forces which shape their
decisions. In his "Harvester" judgement pursuant to the Excise Tariff  Act (1906), 
Higgins expressed difficulty in having to "devise great principles o f  action as 
between great classes, or to lay down what is fair and reasonable as between 
contending interests", pointing out that "it is the function of the Legislature not
the Judiciary, to deal with social and economic problems; it is for the judiciary to
apply, and, when necessary, to interpret the enactments of the Legisla ture".2 His
difficulty sprang from seeing his role in judicial rather than quasi-legislative
terms, which is what arbitration on interest matters is all about: the creation of
new rights, and not the interpretation of existing rights. But he soon came to
terms with his task.
Earlier, in 1905, his New South Wales counterpart had also raised the issue: the
Act "confers very extensive powers, whilst affording almost no guidance as to the
manner in which those powers are to be exercised ... as to what the results of the
new method (of settling industrial disputes) are to be the Act is silent".2 In 1918, 
some legislative guidance was given on the basic wage but for the most part, the 
principles rested on the judgem ent of the tribunal.
The principles which came out of the early tribunals - basic wage, comparative 
wage justice, women's wages - may seem like bold innovations in wage fixing 
made by adventurous tribunals. On closer examination, they appear to conform in 
substance to conventional labour market norms.
Consider first the basic wage which Higgins drew out of his Harvester inquiry 
and subsequently applied in settlement of wage disputes. The notion of a 'living 
wage" to meet the basic needs of a family unit was not new. It had been the 
subject of debate for many years before 1907. Heydon, the President of the New 
South Wales Court of Arbitration had. in 1905, decided that it was the Court's duly 
to assist "if possible, so to arrange the business of the country that every worker, 
however humble, shall receive enough to enable him to lead a human life, to 
marry and bring up a family and maintain them and h im self with, at any rate, 
some small degree o f  com fort”.4 Although not articulated in such precise terms,
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the various anti-sweating inquiries in the colonies were based on a concern about 
the living standards of workers. In 1890, Sir Samuel Griffith introduced a Bill into 
the Queensland Parliam ent g iving recognition to the princip le  that workers 
should be paid a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard o f  life. It is not
to stretch the facts unduly to say that one of the factors behind support for 
compulsory arbitration was to allow wage earners, especially the unskilled, a
reasonable standard o f  life by rectifying the existing lopsided balance of 
industrial power in favour o f  employers. Deakin in speaking to the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Bill in 1903 said that "no measures ever submitted by any 
legislature offer greater prospects of the establishment of social justice  and of the 
removal o f  inequalities than those which are based on the principle  of
conciliation and arbitration. The Bill has been drawn from first to last, looking at
the employer and the employee with strictly equal eyes, with a view to bringing
them before the Bar o f  the tribunal where ... they shall have meted out to them
evenhanded justice  ..."^ The absence of an adequate public finance basis for
attending to the social welfare needs of the low income groups made the concept 
of a living wage the only viable alternative.
Summarising the forces leading up to the determination o f  Higgins' basic wage, 
Peter McCarthy says:®
"... for more than a decade and a half there occurred an unbroken series of 
'm onster dem onstra tions , protest m eetings, w ell-pub lic ised  deputa tions to 
governm ents, rallies o f  the unemployed, 'revelations ' at industrial 
arbitration hearings, expose's  by the Anti-Sw eating League, social welfare 
oriented parliam entary debates - the whole draw ing attention to and
eliciting sym pathy for 'the unskilled labourer'. U nderstandably , the 
B u l l e t in , concluded: 'The public ... has had "living wage" so much drummed
into its ear that it has come to regard a bare living 'living wage' as the
proper wage for the working man to get".
Moreover, the living wage concept had been widely canvassed in o ther countries 
too. Pope Leo xiii's encyclical, Rerum  N o v aru m . proclaimed in 1891 that "there is 
a dictate o f  nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between
man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-carncr
in reasonable and frugal com fort" .7 This pronouncem ent would have been
known throughout the world at least by those concerned with the labour market, 
and although not acknowledged as an influence in their judgem ents , there is a
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familiar ring in the words used by Australian tribunals, including Higgins, in 
defining the living or basic wage.
It was not only the living wage concept which was widely accepted as proper; 
there was reality also in the figure chosen by Higgins. In fixing 7/- as the daily 
wage which was "fair and reasonable" for a family unit, Higgins was guided by 
evidence based on a rough budget survey and by what public utilities were 
paying. But as McCarthy has shown, for many years before 1907, the 
appropriateness o f  this figure had been the subject o f  intense advocacy. "Most 
noticeable is the constant harping of the need to raise and to standardize 7 
shillings a day as the 'living wage’ for unskilled labourers. And with no less 
enthusiasm, labour m em bers, on the first occasion Com m onw ealth  parliam ent 
debated public servants' salaries, pressed for and secured a minimum living wage 
of 42 shillings for a six day week for all male, adult, government employees".8
Finally, the immediate context in which Higgins fixed the basic wage was 
significant. The concept underlying the Excise Tariff Act had been an issue of 
public debate, at least in Victoria, for some years before Federation in the form of 
the "New Protection" policy in which wage earners were expected to share in the 
benefits of protection.
In all the circumstances, it would have been very surprising if  Higgins had not
decided as he did. True, there were overtones of defiance of supply and demand in
some of his decisions after 1907 and in the claim that the basic wage was 
"sacrosanct" and "beyond the reach of bargaining". But to say that he overlooked
market forces would be to put it too harshly. He did after all take notice of what 
the unskilled wage was in certain areas; and settlements by consent in 1906 
before O'Connor for unskilled labourers (for example, in Bagshaw 's case)9 varied 
between 6/6 and 7/6. Further, he made it clear in his first basic wage award1 0 
that "I should like it to be understood that I have never laid down that the 
capabilities of an industry are not to be taken into consideration". Also, "unless 
the circumstances are very exceptional, the needy em ployer should be required to
pay at the same rate as his richer rival. The remuneration o f  the employee 
cannot be allowed to depend on the profits made by the individual employer; but
the profits of the industry as a whole may be taken into account" .11 This is surely
in line with the neo-classical case for an efficient allocation of labour in a
competitive labour market. If he had fixed an unskilled wage for certain 
employers higher than one which might have resulted from "higgling o f  the
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market", it was because he regarded the higgling process, under individual 
bargaining as an unequal contest between the em ployer and the individual 
worker. A fair conclusion is that he adopted and facilitated the extension o f  what
he perceived as a community standard rather than that he created one. It should 
also be noted that the Harvester wage took some years to flow generally and that 
in that time prices were rising.
His justification for extending the Harvester standard to others was that it was a 
"danger to industrial peace when workmen performing the same work" are 
receiving different pay. Kelly put it aptly when he said in 1942:
"The Court has regarded itself, I think properly, as the interpreter, not the 
censor, o f  the social conscience. Thus, when in its determinations it gave 
effect to the concept of the basic wage, it was giving effect to a concept
which originated not in its own mind in the Harvester case or elsewhere,
nor in the precedent legislation but in the social conscience which 
expressed itself in the latter half o f the century and the beginning of this 
when the evils of poverty and inefficiency attending the unbridled 
application of the doctrines o f  laissez faire became so m an ifes t" .12
When Powers awarded automatic quarterly cost of living adjustments to the basic 
wage in 1922, he took his cue from what was becoming a growing practice 13. 
Automatic adjustments had already spread by consent and agreem ent in a number 
of awards, falling prices in 1921 presumably making such a practice attractive to 
employers. The Court merely extended and refined the practice to awards 
generally as being consistent with the basic wage idea.
The determination o f  margins or relative wages provides another example of the 
influence of the norms and practices of the labour market on the principles
adopted by the tribunal. The term "comparative wage justice" may have been
coined and popularised by Australian tribunals but the concept and its application 
goes back to much earlier times in many countries. It was given academic 
respectability in Britain by no less an authority than Alfred Marshall. Using the
term "fair wages” instead o f  comparative wage justice, he defined such a wage as 
being "about on a level o f  average payment for tasks in o ther trades which are of 
equal d ifficulty  and disagreeableness , which require equally  rare natural 
abilities and an equally expensive tra in ing" .14 Its application would produce a 
wage structure s im ilar to that which results from a freely opera ting  competitive
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labour market, reflecting the relative supply prices of labour of various kinds. It 
is also the basis of job evaluation systems. Mr Justice Kelly put the generally 
accepted meaning of comparative wage justice in the following way as far back as 
1942:
The task o f  the Court in the settlement by arbitration of disputes regarding 
wages is that o f  ascertaining what in all the circumstances can be said for 
fair payment for the particular work in question. The justice  of awarding 
any particular rate depends on whether it answers this test o f  fairness. But 
fairness is a relative concept. It means consistency with some accepted 
standard. And it is not for the Court to create standards. The function of 
the Court is simply to recognize such accepted standards as are not shown to 
it to be unjust, extravagant or inadequate. It is for these reasons, that the
Court from its inception has allowed itself to be guided in its assessment of
'fair' wages by the evidence of what reasonable employers o f  competent
labour have found it desirable to pay and what competent workmen have
been willing to accept for any particular class o f  work. Such evidence has, 
in fact, provided the only practicable starting point from which to 
approach the wage-fixing problem. To supplement it, however, the Court 
has always been prepared to admit proof of any circumstances which may 
tend to show that, because of the economic situation in which either the
employers or the employees, or both, find themselves, the adoption and 
perpetuation of previously current wage rates on levels would in fact be 
u n f a i r . 1 5
The words "it is not for the Court to create standards" are worth emphasising.
The reduction in standard hours of work from 48 to 44 for many awards in the
federal jurisdiction was preceded by State legislation in Queensland and New 
South Wales providing for such reduction. Again, the federal 40-hour week
standard awarded in 1948 was preceded by New South Wales legislation. More 
recently, the 38-hour week was conceded by collective bargaining in the metal 
industry in 1981 from which it flowed generally.
It is in connection with the determination of women's wages that the
endorsement of conventional standards by tribunals is most clearly seen. Higgins
articulated the principle as early as 1912 and it remained substantially in force 
with slight modifications until 1972. The basis of the principle was to distinguish
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work which had been done mainly by males from work traditionally done mainly 
by females. In male work, women workers who may be said to be in competition 
with male workers, would have to be paid the full male rate. In effect, in these 
circumstances, equal pay for equal work would apply but only to protect the male 
worker, the "typical breadwinner", from being undercut by female workers. In 
female work, the basic wage component was to be a fraction of the male basic 
wage, sufficient to meet the "normal needs o f  a single woman supporting herself 
by her own exertions" and not the normal needs of a family unit o f  five. As for 
margins for skill, female margins were to be based on relative work requirements 
and related to market rates. Comparative wage justice would apply only within 
the segmented female labour market, and not across the whole labour market.
This principle was no more than a rationalised ratification of the social values 
and standards o f  the times. But it was also consistent with supply and demand 
conditions which were in part determined by conventional a ttitudes on the place 
of women in the workforce. As these changed and areas of work hitherto closed 
to women were opened up, so women's wages rose relatively in the market place, 
and awards followed suit. The course o f  women's wages in Australia followed that 
of many other countries and for similar reasons. By the 1950's, the female basic
wage had risen from 56% to 75% of the male basic wage; female margins in many 
industries had moved to equality, or close to it, with male margins. But the 
Higgins principle remained in place. In the 1949-50 Basic Wage Case, Mr. Justice 
Foster, a man not tied to orthodoxy, said;1^
( a )  the male basic wage was a social wage for a man, his wife and family .....
( b )  equal pay based on the male basic wage would put an intolerable strain 
on the economy;
( c )  it was socially preferable to provide a higher wage for the male because 
o f  his social obligations to financee, wife as family;
( d )  whilst single females were said to be anxious to receive the higher wage 
their interest changed on their marriage ... As married women they 
becam e concerned that their husbands should bring home the largest 
possib le  pay envelope.
The Com m ission’s 1969 Equal Pay decision followed in substance the provisions 
made a few years earlier under various State laws enlarging the scope for equal 
pay, but it was not until 1972 that the Higgins principle was formally abandoned. 
By introducing the principle of equal pay for equal va lue , the way was opened
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for the extension o f  comparative wage justice across gender lines. The stated 
rationale of the Commission 's  decision was the changed social and industrial 
climate. It said:17
As to equal pay, the broad issue we have to decide is whether in the present 
social and industrial climate it is fair and reasonable that the 1969 
principles should remain unaltered. This involves us in making an 
assessment o f  what, if  anything, has happened in the area of equal pay 
since 1969 which would make it just and proper for us to alter those 
p r in c i p l e s .
We think that broad changes of significance have occurred since 1969.
These changes are reflected in the attitudes o f  governments in Australia
and in developments in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and elsewhere.
All these changes require us to reconsider the 1969 principles and to look 
at them in the light o f  present circumstances. We have given 
consideration to merely amending those principles but we consider that it 
is better for us to state positively a new principle. In our view the concept 
of 'equal pay for equal work' is too narrow in today's world and we think 
the time has come to enlarge the concept to 'equal pay for work of equal 
value'. This means that award rates for all work should be considered 
without regard to the sex o f  the employee.
In 1974, the Commission extended the (adult male) national minimum wage to
females, describing it as a "logical extension o f  the equal pay principles" of 1972.
At the same time, it formally abandoned the notional family wage aspect of the
national minimum wage (which had replaced the basic wage in 1966), noting the 
difficulty of "doing adequate justice  to the widely varying family obligations of 
workers on the minimum wage", and reminding the parties that it was "an 
industrial arbitration tribunal, not a social welfare agency ."1^ The break with
the Higgins period was now formally recognised so far as the lowest wage of the 
"humblest class of workers" was concerned.
The Postwar Experience with Quasi-Collective Bargaining
The postwar social, industrial and economic climate had changed not only for
women's wages but also for the kind of wage fixing approach which was tenable.
In the early postw ar years, the tribunal lagged somewhat behind the change in 
the climate of the labour market. It understood that the basic wage had for some 
time gone beyond its original concept of being kind o f  national social minimum 
wage; because the basic wage was also a substantial component of most wages and 
salaries, its movem ent constituted a movement in the general level of wages. 
Although unintended by its founders, an evolutionary process had placed in the 
hands o f  the tribunal, willy nilly, an instrument as powerful in its economic 
ramifications as budgetary and monetary policy. This became clear during the 
Great Depression of the 1930's when the Court ordered a 10% reduction in real 
wages; and o f  course, also during World W ar II, when wage restraint under 
National Security Regulations was the basis of its policy.
However, the tribunal did not adjust quickly enough to the postwar developments. 
The era o f  high unemployment, characteristic of the years before World War II, 
was over. In that period, high unemployment and the overall weakness o f  unions 
ensured that the prescrip tions of arbitrators were generally not much exceeded 
by pressure for ovcraward payments. The circumstances of the postwar period -
the high noon of Keynesian economics - were somewhat different - low 
unem ploym en t,  rapid econom ic  growth, inflationary tendencies , well established 
unions, and governm ents committed to full employment policy. Tribunals had 
some difficulty  sorting out their role in this environment. Kelly, the Chief Judge 
of the Comm onwealth  Court at the time, seemed to regard the control of inflation 
as the Court's primary task. In the 1949-50 Basic Wage Case, in rejecting any wage 
increase despite  evidence o f  substantial economic prosperity, he said that the 
Court's duty was "to give a lead to the other instruments of adjustment by taking a 
firm stand to stabilise, as well as lies in its power, the level of wages ... However 
limited its power may be to 'stop the rot', that power should be exercised."1 ^
His minority view in that case, did not prevail but he persisted in this approach. 
His stand may well have influenced Chief Commissioner Galvin to reject in 1952 
any increase in m argins because of the inflationary situation, despite evidence of 
a sharp contraction in differentials for skill. Late in 1951, Kelly took the 
initiative to call a conference of employers and unions and to make suggestions 
involving the stabilisation o f  the basic wage, margins, prices and hours of work. 
This was followed early in the following year by a letter to the parties setting out 
a fourteen-point plan which went beyond wages and hours to taxation, subsidies, 
tariffs and monetary policy. The plan was rejected by the parties, not 
s u r p r i s i n g l y .
1 0
This case provides a lesson on the very narrow limits to which the tribunal can
act as a prime mover; although, to be fair, Kelly's aim was a voluntary compact.
Calling a conference is unexceptionable. Making specific suggestions in such
detail, particularly on general economic policy, is another. And the lesson was
not lost on later tribunals. However, it is surprising that Kelly as Presiding Judge
could have been associated so soon after with the following expression of the 
Court's function contained in the 1952/53 Basic Wage Standard Hours Case:
"The Arbitration Court is neither a social and economic legislature. Its 
function under ... the Act is to prevent or settle specific industrial disputes
... the powers conferred upon it by that section are in respect of subjects
which by their  very nature  attract considerations  o f  general significance
The exercise of these powers consequently has widespread social and
economic results; but it is not the function of the Court to aim at such social 
and economic changes as may seem to be desirable to the members of the
t r i b u n a l .
The function o f  the Court must be exercised in the social and economic
setting of the time at which it makes its decision."
These words could have been uttered by Higgins20 but they do not describe the 
approach taken by Kelly in 1950-53. Further, the words sit uneasily in a decision 
which abandoned automatic cost of living adjustments and was strongly
influenced by Kelly's great worry about inflation. But it m isread the economic,
industrial and social setting o f  the time. Not only had inflation petered out by the
middle of 1953, but to apply wage restraint under conditions of full employment 
simply by the decree of the tribunal was untenable. The labour market would not 
sustain it. The Court was divided on this issue and the circumstances which
resulted in the decision having the appearance of unanim ity are discussed by
Blanche d’Alpuget in her biography o f  Sir Richard K irby .2 1
The abandonment of cost o f  living adjustments provided the impetus for unions
generally to go outside the system for improvements as a m atter o f  policy. Wages
were being driven by overaw ard payments through shopfloor action and p iece­
meal quasi-collective bargaining, the tribunal being drawn into these processes 
by way of conciliation and to ratify agreements and consent awards. These
settlements increasingly set the standard for arbitrated awards in those areas
where unions were weak and in pans of the public sector. The dominance, which
arbitrated decisions of tribunals had a ad over wage m ovem ents was being shared
with collective bargaining; and, as I will argue presently , their inter-action gave
us the worst of both worlds. Of course, such a situation may have developed, 
probably later, in the new economic environment, even if cost o f living
adjustments had been m aintained in she 1953 decision.
The newly established Com m ission which took over the arbitral functions of the
Court in 1956, quickly becam e aware of the new environment and adjusted itself to
it. Its President, Sir R ichard Kirby, apart from discarding the sartorial trappings 
o f  the jud ic iary , p roducing grea ter ccmity and cooperation betw een judges and 
com m issioners within the Com m ission and involving h im self  more actively in the 
public forum through industrial relations and other societies, led the Commission
in important changes in approaches and principles until his retirem ent in 1973.
Impressed by the pressure for real -ag e  maintenance and improvement in the 
labour market, the Commission partly relented from its stand in the 1952-53 Case. 
The CPI was to become a dominant - semi-automatic - factor in annual basic wage
adjustments, and later total wage adjusiments. The development o f  the total wage -
the merging into one of the basic wage and margin - had come about because, in 
effect, the adjustm ent o f  metal trades margins had become another national wage
round. The rapid transm ission of this adjustment to margins generally 
established the logic o f  national adjustment o f  the total wage. The greater 
frequency and regularity  o f  national wage adjustments now to be an annual 
event - reflected recognition o f  the temper of the labour market in a full 
em p lo y m e n t  e co n o m y .
The changed econom ic and industrial environm ent also necessita ted  a change in 
the approach o f  the Commission if it was to serve its charter. Collective
bargaining type se ttlem ents  becam e increasingly com m on and affected the way
arbitration could work. In the words ef the Commission in the 1970 Oil Industry
case, "parties may be o f  the view that if conciliation fails, any subsequent 
arbitration would be more realistic if the arbitrators are able to put themselves in
the position o f  negotiators and L o regard arbitration as a prologation or
extension o f  the n e g o t i a t i o n s . " ^  Sir Richard Kirby has given a succinct account 
o f  the basis o f  the Commission 's  approach in dealing with non-national wage 
disputes in the fo llowing terms:
1 2
Ihcrc will be a better understanding of the workings o f  the 
Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration system if we look at the 
Commission as a key-stone of our industrial relations system, rather than as
a legal institution or as an economic policy maker ... The industrial 
relationship ... is an ever-continuing one at the lower levels where
particular workers and employers disagree and also at h igher levels where 
organization is national. The settlement of one particular dispute does not 
end their relationship there and then. Not only must they continue to
work to maintain the productive process, but it is inevitable that there will 
be further disagreements, at any rate about other issues from time to time. 
Each particular solution may not be the solution sought by both or either of 
the parties but at least it must, in the ultimate, become acceptable to both. 
Without this mutual acceptance the economic co-operation which is 
essential in the production of goods and services for the community will 
break down. ... The imposition of a settlement, to which one or both of the 
parties is strongly opposed may, in fact, result in a deterioration of the 
situation. Similarly, if the constant or near-constant im pression is given
that a party must be rapped over the knuckles for mistaken thinking or 
even misbehaviour, the efficiency o f  the system must inevitably suffer. 
Again, even though the word "expediency" has or may have certain
undesirable undertones, it may well be that in particular situations it is an 
expedient solution which must be reached.22
This is clearly a departure from the Higgins approach which prevailed until the 
early 1950's. The "judicial" approach of that period called for the determination of 
issues in the light of evidence and argument, and on the basis o f  principles, not
in accordance with the dictates o f  the strong. The tribunal should not be
opportunist and never yield to force. It should "assert the rule o f  right as against 
the force of might". It will not purchase peace by compromising the methods of 
force. And so on.24But times had changed. The balance o f  industrial and market 
power had moved strongly in the unions' favour. Higgins "judicial" style 
arbitration would not work. The Commission had to adapt to its new environment, 
to find a new style and new principles to serve the objects o f  the Act under which 
it operated. To have pursued primarily an anti-inflation objective in the
circumstances would not only have failed but would have resulted in substantial 
economic loss from industrial action.25 And so a new style o f  "accommodative" 
arbitration dominated by quasi-collective bargaining took its place. Arbitration 
had for many areas in effect become a mediation process operating by pursuasion
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rather than compulsion. In those areas where union power was still weak or was 
not being exercised, the Higgins approach of extending the standards established 
by collective bargain ing , continued to apply.
There was nothing wrong in this approach provided industrial action and wage 
inflation were held at acceptable levels. Until the late 60's, this was the case. But 
then things started to go wrong. A three-tiered system of wage increases began to 
develop - national wage, piece-meal industry or award adjustments, and
overaward payments - the amount at each level progressively boosting the others 
in an economically and industrially destructive way. In 1969, the Commission 
made a valiant attempt to limit increases beyond the "economic" increases granted 
in the national wage cases by stating the principles on which such other 
increases should be awarded. But the three-tiered system pushed on relentlessly, 
the overall increases in wages rising yearly to explosive d imensions and lifting 
p r ices  a cco rd in g ly .
I do not mean to imply that the wage fixing processes were the main villains of 
the piece. Fiscal and monetary policies in the period aided and abetted wage rises, 
and any attem pt to apply greater restraint through awards would not have been 
sustainable. W age policy cannot be expected to work single-handedly as an
instrument o f  wage restraint. The Commission understood this even if many 
economists did not.
By 1974, the time had come for the Commission to seriously consider whether 
national wage adjustments had a place any longer in the system. Sectional wage 
increases at industry and individual award level, largely by consent were flowing 
through the system and building up such a large general wage increase that a 
national wage increase would surely add fuel to what already was an explosive 
trend. The Commission posed this prospect seriously to the parties in the 1974 
National Wage decision.
W hat em erged  from the decentralised quasi-co llec tive  bargain ing  approach of 
the 1960's and early 1970's was that it proved to be highly inflationary. No party 
desired such an outcom e, but the absence o f  a self-regulating mechanism within
the labour m arket which would avoid excessive wage and price increases created 
a self-destructive process as each group, quite rationally, pursued its own 
interest. What was needed in the circumstances was an m echanism which was
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able to take a macro view of sectional wage increases and avoid economic damage 
from excessive overall wage increase.
Experiments with Incomes Policy
It was in this context that the highly centralised and structured indexation system 
was introduced by the Commission in 1975. It is important to dwell a little on this
phase of the history of the system; for it provides a telling illustration of the
Commission as a facilitator. The case for wage indexation was argued principally
by the unions and the Commonwealth Government. But they conceded that it 
would have to be part of a package of principles to ensure restraint on wage 
increase eminating from sources other than the national wage. It was argued 
that wage indexation would m oderate inflation by rem oving  self-fu lfill ing  
inflationary expectations from wage claims; that it was a fair basis for national 
wage adjustment; and that it would reduce industrial disputes. The employers and 
some of the States which opposed it contended that indexation would merely add 
another tier to the system with even more serious inflationary consequences.
I shall not dwell on the details o f  the package introduced by the Commission.
These are adequately covered in the literature.26 What I wish to emphasis is the 
basis on which the new approach was taken: it was that any increases in wages
outside national wage would be negligible overall and would be processed by
appropriate principles in an orderly fashion. A recurrence o f  the uncontrolled
second and third tier increases of the magnitude which had occurred would
destroy the prospects for indexation. The assurance o f  the ACTU on this 
assumption of the package was a material factor in the Com m ission 's  decision to 
accede to indexation. But the Commission had no illusions about the fragility of 
the system and it warned that "violation even by a small section o f  industry, 
whether in the award or non-award area would put at risk the future of 
indexation for a ll" .27
Long before the Accord, the Commission was effectively being asked to embark on 
a quasi-incomes policy but with charge only of federal award pay. It therefore
called for "supporting m echanisms" from governm ents to ensure  that those 
matters which were outside the Commission's control but had an important effect 
on wage claims - prices, government charges and taxation - were handled in ways
which would assist in wage restraint.
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While acknowledging that a stand-still on wages for the present would be the most 
salutory policy for the economy, the Commission did not believe that such a 
course was realistic and sustainable. It concluded that on balance
... some form o f  wage indexation would contribute to a more rational system 
o f  wage fixation, to more orderly, more equitable and less inflationary 
wage increases and to better industrial relations, p r o v id e d  that indexation 
was part o f  a package which included appropriate wage fixing principles 
and the necessary 'supporting mechanisms' to ensure their viability. This 
conclusion is not inconsistent with much o f  the evidence and argument put 
in opposition to indexation .2 8
Thus the Com mission embarked on a new course based essentially and largely on 
the conditions and expectations expressed by substantial elements o f  those who 
appeared before it. Moreover, it was tentative and cautious. It laid down the 
principles and said that "the next few months will provide the opportunity for the 
viability of these conditions to be tested". Further: "The Commission does not
operate in an institutional vacuum and the outcome and the future of indexation 
will, therefore, depend not only on the Commission's decisions but also on the 
extent to which unions, em ployers, the Australian and State Governments and 
ultimately the public at large are prepared to lend their weight to the conditions 
necessary for the success o f  indexation".2 9
The enthusiastic  acceptance o f  the conditions by nearly all participants were 
evident three months later. It was a firm endorsement to continue with the 
centralised system. Inflation slowed down and industrial disputes fell.
Refinements were made to some o f  the principles in the light o f  experience and 
in due course, less than full indexation became necessary because o f  the state of 
the economy. The new regime seemed to be working well for two years. Then it 
began to break down. The conditions necessary for its successful operation
becam e progressively  com prom ised  as parties and governm ents lost their 
com m itm ent to the system.
By the middle o f  1979, the Commission was ready to abandon the system. The high
degree o f  consensus on the requirements o f  the system which prevailed in earlier
years had gradually evaporated. "It appears", the Commission summed up, "that 
one side wants indexation w ithout restraints while the o ther wants restraints 
w ithou t i n d e x a t i o n " . 30 While believing that the existing system offered the
1 6
potential for industrial and economic stability, this potential could not be realised 
without substantial comm itm ent to its requirements. A passage, which was 
repeated by the Commission a number of times in later years, expresses in 
substance the theme of this paper: "The Commission has no vested interest in
indexation or any other system of wage fixation. In accordance with its statutory 
obligations, it seeks to apply that system which provides a viable balance between 
industrial and econom ic considerations" .^  1
The Commission called a conference to consider the future of the system. It 
reported later that there was "a universal desire that a centralized system should 
continue"; and that despite an absence o f  consensus on the structure and 
principle of the system, "there had been a significant narrow ing  o f  differences 
between the main part ies" .22
And so, in retrospect mistakenly, the system was kept alive until the middle of
1981 when it became clear beyond doubt to the Commission that the degree of
sectional flexibility being demanded by the parties could not be sustained by a 
centralised system based on indexation. Indexation, and by implication, national 
wage adjustments were abandoned. It was to be an award-by-award, decentralised 
system of wage determination. The labour market, under the euphoria of a 
supposed minerals boom, reverted to collective bargaining in the style and on the 
scale reminiscent of the years immediately before indexation. The Metal Industry 
Agreement on wage increases and a 38-hour week, representing an increase in
labour cost of around 25%, became the standard for a flow-on. A call by the ACTU
early in 1982 for a conference to consider return to a centralised system based on 
indexation was refused by the Commission in the face o f  opposition from the 
employers and the Com m onw ealth  Government, both preferr ing  the case-by-case 
approach to continue "unaided and unfettered" by the Commission. The 
preference for a more deregulated labour market was c lear in the 
Commonwealth's submission. The Commission expressed willingness to move 
down the path of decentralisation and sought submissions from the 
Commonwealth and others on the details o f  such a process.
However, the mood for deregulation lapsed in the light of the wage explosion 
which emanated from such a system and the onset of a serious economic 
recession. In December 1982, the Commission convened at the request of the 
Commonwealth Government supported by the State Governm ent and employers 
seeking a wage pause, in effect, a return to a centralised system. The unions did
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not put up a strong case against a pause, and in all the circumstances, subject to 
minor exceptions, the Com m ission prescribed guidelines for the pause for a period 
of 6 months, following which the matter would be reviewed.
A Federal election three months later brought a change of Government. The new 
Government was bound by an Accord with the trade union m ovement and 
committed to an incomes policy. The Commonwealth described its incomes and 
prices policy, a concept endorsed by the National Economic Summit, as the
"corner-stone” of its economic strategy. The ACTU expressed a firm commitment 
to a "no-extra-cla im s” provision within an indexation package. Further, the CPI 
was expected to be deflated by between 2% and 3% by the introduction of 
Medicare. These were circumstances which made a return to something like the 
earlier  indexation package, industrially  and economically, a m ore viable 
p r o p o s i t i o n .
Support for a structured centralised  system was well-nigh universal. But the 
em ployers, a lthough conceding that price movements were a relevant
consideration in national wage cases, were opposed to the inclusion of prima facie
indexation in the package. However, the Commission was impressed with the 
"profound change in the context in which a centralized system would operate" 
and it agreed operate such a system, setting out more explicitly than ever before 
the conditions for it to work effectively and concluding:
It will be c lear that the conditions stated above as being necessary for full 
indexation to be viable, industrially and economically, go to the
m inim isation o f  labour cost increases outside national wage, consistency in
the application o f  the Principles generally, the honouring  o f  undertakings
and the ex is tence  o f  supporting mechanisms which ensure  restraint on 
prices and non-w age incom es, restraint on governm ent charges and 
taxation especially those which feed into the CPI, and attention to the social
w a g e .^  3
The parties had to be reminded of the lessons learnt from the failure of the first 
indexa tion  period!
For about two years the new system worked reasonably well. But then a balance 
of payments crisis developed: the collapse in commodity prices turned the terms
of trade sharply against Australia , the floating exchange rate depreciated
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substantially, and the international debt rose to an alarmingly high level. The
basis of the Accord - maintaining real wages and in time raising it - could not be
sustained in this economic environm ent without a very large increase in
unemployment. The problem could only be overcome by a m ajor restructuring of 
the economy, increasing exports especially o f  manufactured goods and services 
and reducing imports. Such restructuring called for increased international 
competitiveness which could be achieved without too drastic a fall in living 
standards if productiv ity  increased  sufficiently .
The importance of productivity growth was appreciated by the Governm ent, and 
peak union and employer organisations. This was reflected in jo in t 
pronouncements on the subjec t,34 by the ACTU/TDC Report, A u s t r a l ia  
R econstruc ted  which called for the development o f  a productivity  "consciousness 
and culture", and by various actions taken by the Commonwealth  Government to
promote productivity in various industries. The need for g reater labour market 
flexibility - especially flexibility in work and management practices - for
productivity growth, was an issue which was commanding the interest also of a
number of other countries.33 The issue went well beyond the matter of wages, on 
which there had been a d isproportionate  concentration for g rea te r  flexibility , 
especially from economists innocent of the operation of the labour market and 
critical of what was seen as undue rigidity in relative wages operating under the 
centralised system. Experience in the 1960's and early 70's and again in 1981/82,
showed that allowing greater relative wage flexibility to operate in an 
unstructured system, did not in practice achieve greater relative wage flexibility. 
Rather, the generalising effect o f flow-on defeated the object and instead
produced an excessive overall wage movement.
It was in the context of the serious developments in the economy and consensus 
on the need for greater productivity that the Commission heard an application in 
1987 by the Confederation of Australian Industry for a two-tiered wage system: 
the first tier being the uniform national wage increase and the second tier being 
subject to a number o f  principles to be applied on an award by award basis. The
second tier would include a principle which would allow a wage increase
contingent on changes in work and m anagem ent prac tices , m ulti-sk il ling , 
flexible time patterns of work and other such elements which would result in 
increase in productivity. The concept was generally supported by the parties and 
governments and accordingly the Commission in substance adopted it.
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Once again, it is important to note that initialise for the new system came from 
the parties which have to live with it. The notion of a "second tier" had of course 
also been a feature o f  the earlier  indexation packages: simultaneous national
wage increase for all awards and specific adjustments on an individual award
basis depending on the particular principles being availed of. W hat was novel 
about this second tier^6 was that it was subject to an upper limit increase of 4% 
and that it changed the balance in the amount of pay increase from being 
predominantly - well over 90% - in the first tier to around 50%. Thus, half of the 
potential wage increase would apply to individual awards at different times, 
depending on the ability of the parties to the award to satisfy the conditions of 
one or more of the second tier principles. This margin of flexibility in wage 
adjustments was intended to draw out improved productivity  through changes in 
work and m anagem ent practices as a requirement of the Restructuring and
Efficiency Principle. This Principle and its successor in the August 1988 
d e c i s i o n ^ 7 rely on negotiations between the parties to achieve productivity 
im provem ents but they differed from earlier  attempts to decentralise  wage 
determination in that they impose an upper limit on the wage increase 
permissable. This was intended to ensure that the degree o f  flexibility allowed in 
the system did not get out of hand as it did in earlier times. This approach also 
d iffered from the aw ard-by-aw ard  arrangement favoured by the Commonwealth 
Government and employers in 1981/82 as part of a more decentralised collective 
bargaining-oriented system. It provided scope for a greater workplace focus 
while maintaining control over the macro wages outcome. Such control was now 
possible only because flexibility was not at large but was within the constraints of 
a structured and regulated centralised system based on consensus o f  the parties 
and indeed, in substance, on the submissions of the parties. It was this consensus 
which fuelled the machinery provided by the Commission and the State tribunals 
to formulate the rules and to apply them. The tribunals are thus a necessary 
condition for the system to work. But they are not a sufficient condition. They 
also need the broad consensus and commitment of the parties to the rules of the 
g a m e .
C onc lud ing  O bserva t ions
Let me now draw the threads together.
We have come a long way from the arbitration system as perceived by its
founders. What was seen as constituting an adjunct o f  collective bargaining, has
become an adjunct of national economic policy. What was conceived as a fish has 
evolved into a fowl!
Higgins and his successors up to the outbreak of World War II, saw as one of the 
objects of the system, the protection of the living standard of wage earners at the 
lower end of the wage scale. Higgins' dream of "a new province for law and 
order" if men "secured the essentials of food, shelter, clothing, etc.", did not 
materialise, and probably never will in a democratic society. Further, the early 
period of federal arbitration saw persistent employer hostility to the system but,
paradoxically, their many challenges on jurisdiction resulted in its extension.
However, the main point I have tried to make is that by and large, arbitration 
principles were framed in line with labour market norms and followed the rates 
struck by the market.
When, during the Depression of the 1930's, the downward course of the market
was impeded by the tribunal's m inimum wage prescriptions, these were adjusted 
downward to meet what was generally seen as the economic requirements of the 
times.
The early postwar period was one of ambivalence for the tribunal. Kelly saw the 
function of the Court as holding back inflation, similar to what had been its 
function in war time. In the circumstances o f  a changed economic and industrial 
environment, this view was unsustainable, and was overtaken by the realistic
Kirby approach: Accom m odative arbitration with prim ary em phasis  on
promoting industrial peace by conciliation rather than im posing by arbitration 
economic policy objectives which were outside the reach o f  the tribunal. The 
alternative, to become irrelevant and ineffective when there was call on its
services, would be contrary to the Act. In a sense, it was back to the original
concept of being an adjunct of collective bargaining.
The survival of the system under Sir Richard's accommodative approach made 
possible its later development into a more positive economic force. In the period 
of Sir John Moore’s Presidency, the parties and governments came to accept the 
need for a more regulated approach to wage increases to overcome the damaging 
and self-defeating effects o f  unfettered sectional wage settlements. Accordingly, 
the Commission provided the means for a centralised system based on a
comprehensive and coherent set o f principles with national wage adjustment by 
indexation as its centre-piece. Later, the waning commitment o f  the parties and
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governments to the requirements of such a system, led the Commission to abandon 
it and to revert to a less structured award-by-award system dominated by 
collective bargaining settlem ents. The wage explosion which followed brought 
claim for a return to a centralised system, first through a wages pause and later 
back to indexation, now underpinned by the Accord and an incomes and prices 
policy. The Commission complied to facilitate the achievement of economic and 
industrial stability  but specified  the requirem ents upon parties and governments 
for such an outcome.
In the early part o f  Mr. Justice M addem 's Presidency, a serious balance of 
payments crisis and the need for substantial productivity im provement to prevent 
further decline in living standards, called for a more enterprise-based wage 
policy. Again, although the Commission and the other tribunals were to be an 
instrument for developm ent o f  a better balance between macro and micro 
objectives, the sources for the change were the parties and governments; and it 
is their comm itm ent to the new system which made its implementation possible.
Thus from Higgins to Kirby, to Moore and to Maddem, each phase was conditioned 
by new problems calling for a new approach and new requirements. The 
developm ent o f  the arbitration system into becoming part o f  the machinery for 
economic policy , reflects changing times and the changed requirem ents of 
economic management. In a way, the nature and scale of wage movements made 
such a developm ent necessary, and this was recognised by the parties generally 
and by governments. But the essential condition for the viability o f  the tribunal’s 
wage policy remain in essence the same as it had been in earlier times; in short, 
what the Com m ission can accomplish depends essentially on what the main 
parties will allow it to do. Legislation to limit obstructive actions by the parties 
and to improve the structure o f  the system can go some way to strengthening the 
power o f  the Commission. But the scope in this direction is marginal. Consensus 
and voluntariness remain the substantial basis on which the arbitration system 
works best. To be viable, its policy must have broad acceptance, however 
grudging, from the main parties and be supported by governments. In must not 
apply its own doctrines and values but should try to establish those held generally 
by the community and by the labour market in particular. It is in this sense that 
the Commission is a facilitator rather than a prime mover or an innovator, 
reactive rather than proactive. A moment's thought should make it plain that an 
a r b i t r a to r ' s  role cannot be otherwise.
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Writing in 1970, Sir Richard Kirby said:
... the Commission should not attempt to impose an unacceptable solution on 
the parties involved simply because of its legal position. I again stress that 
it must seek decisions which will be accepted, even though there may be 
disagreement with them, as being both appropriate and ju st  in the 
particular circumstances o f  each case and to the extent that the 
acceptability is determined by the nature in which they are framed . . .3 8
Of course, the arbitration system has not been free o f  critics. Through the years
up the present, there have been those who as a matter o f  doctrine regard the 
system with hostility. But to be persuasive, doctrine needs to be tested in the real 
labour market, not an assumed ideal one. Those^^ who at present believe in the 
virtues of a deregulated labour market (by which is probably meant a greatly 
reduced role of tribunals) give too little weight to the notion o f  "fairness" in the 
labour market and the concentration of economic power in it. Without a level of 
unemployment much h igher than currently  prevails , deregu la tion  would give 
these forces of the market free rein, as was the case before 1975 and in 1981/82. 
The regulatory mould of the kind now applying, has facilitated a remarkable 
degree of wage restraint accom panied by reduced industrial action, allowing 
employment to grow and the rate of unemployment to fall in a period of severe 
balance of payments crisis. From past experience, it is difficult to believe that 
such an outcome could have been achieved in a deregulated system.
Then there are cynics4^ who regard the Commission's ability to adapt and survive 
as due to its devilishly cunning capacity for self-serving. It has been said on the 
basis of the "capture" theory that the Commission and other industrial tribunals
take a life of their own and promote their own interest rather than the public
interest. Such assertion without evidence deserve no credit. Any institution, by 
fulfilling the terms of its charter, could be said to be furthering it own interest 
and survival. The test surely is whether it operates inconsistently with its 
charter and subverts the public interest in favour of its own interest. This is a 
matter of evidence which has so far not been presented.
May I finally make a few concluding observations.
To argue that the Commission is a facilitator rather than a prime mover and that 
its capacity to deliver one or other systems depends ultimately on the will of the
parties is not to under-rate its critical importance in industrial relations and in
economic policy. I said earlier that although the Commission and the State
tribunals are not a sufficient condition for the system to work, they are a 
necessa ry  c o n d it ion .
The longstanding history of the Commission, its memory and its adaptability, give 
strength to its authority and acceptability as a facilitator. It is not the kind of 
institution which can be created in a hurry. Over the years, its procedures,
especially in national wage matters, have been refined and speeded up. It is a
forum for public debate on important industrial relations and wage issues. Its
reasoned decisions are intended to have an explanatory, persuasive and educative 
role on the issues being determined. The practice o f  anaminous single decisions 
has strengthened the force o f  its decisions. Further, the acceptability of its
decisions is also enhanced by limiting the life o f  any set of principles to no more
than two years, to be followed by a review. Last but not least, the judgmental 
skills o f  those who make up the Commission in national cases, their ability to 
d istinguish  substance from the rhetroic which is a feature o f  some submissions
and media releases of the parties, their sensitivity on what is likely to work and
how far to go in a particular direction - all these qualities and more are essential
for the successful operation o f  the system. A distinguished English labour 
econom ists. Sir Henry Phelps Brown, has described the Australian arbitration 
system as a "precious legacy".41 It is fair to add that the adaptability shown by the
system in the difficult Kirby period helped to preserve this legacy and showed the
way for future flex ib ility  under different conditions.
The next point I wish to make is that a distinction should be drawn between the 
form ulation o f  principles and their implementation in a centralised system of the
kind which has applied since 1975. The former is a quasi-legislative process in
which the Com m ission gives careful consideration to the general acceptability of
a given set of principles and avoids adopting a system which is likely to fail. Most
of what I have had to say relates to this issue. The application of principles, on
the o ther hand, is an administrative process in which consistency is essential
regardless of the power o f  the party. The integrity of the system depends on this 
requirement. It is here that the Higgins "judicial" approach should be applied.
Finally, the history o f  the arbitration system shows its ability to adapt to 
changing economic and industrial needs. It is not an ossified centralist 
institution. In recent times, in line with changed circumstances, it has shown the
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capacity to move to individual award and enterprise-specific  wage adjustments 
w ith in  a centralised system. It has retained the centralised umbrella to ensure 
that the macro requirements o f  the system - the avoidance of excessive general 
money wage increases - arc not violated. As in the past, the future of the
Commission will depend on its ability to sense and grasp the requirements of a 
changing industrial society. If these requirements turn out to be o f  the kind 
which calls for the abandonment of a centralised role or a differently structured
role or one which operates more by conciliation than arbitration, there is within 
the system sufficient resilence to meet these requirements. The direction in 
which it moves will depend ultimately on those who are affected by its operation - 
unions, employers and governm ents - and whose comm itm ent to a particular 
approach is necessary for its success. The Commission has amply demonstrated
that it has no vested interest in and no preconceived policy for any one approach. 
On the basis of its history, it is reasonable to suppose that the Commission will 
facilitate the operation o f  the particular approach which is both sustainable and
perceived to be, in the circumstances, best for the public interest. There will be
mistakes and miscalculations from time to time. But perfection in industrial 
relations is for the millenium.
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